Proposed by: Studied since Gauss/Minkowski; cryptographic relevance by Miklós Ajtai (1996); assumptiond quantum-hard
Category: Lattice / post-quantum (worst-case foundation)
Mathematical form
A lattice is L(B)={Bz:z∈Zn} for a basis B∈Rn×n. Let λ1(L) be the length of its shortest nonzero vector, λi the successive minima.
GapSVPγ. Given (B,d), decide whether λ1(L(B))≤d or λ1(L(B))>γ(n)⋅d.
SIVPγ. Given B, find n linearly independent vectors of length ≤γ(n)⋅λn(L(B)).
Assumption. For γ(n)=poly(n) (e.g., O~(n)), no polynomial-time algorithm — classical or quantum — solves GapSVPγ or SIVPγ in the worst case.
Best known algorithms
Exact/near-exact SVP: 2Θ(n) time (sieving: 20.292n classical, 20.257n quantum heuristic).
Poly-factor approximation: LLL achieves 2O(n) factors in poly time; BKZ interpolates (block size β gives ≈βn/β factor in 2Θ(β) time).
NP-hard for constant γ (Ajtai, Micciancio, Khot); poly γ regime is NOT NP-hard (in NP∩coNP for γ≥n) — hardness is a genuine assumption.
Notably no quantum speedup beyond generic ones is known — the basis of post-quantum confidence.
Importance
The unique selling point of lattice cryptography: worst-case to average-case reductions. Ajtai (1996) reduces worst-case SIVP to [[sis]]; Regev (2005) reduces worst-case GapSVP/SIVP quantumly to [[lwe]]. Thus breaking the average-case schemes below breaks every instance of these lattice problems.